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KEEPING TABS ON FINANCIAL INNOVATION:
PRODUCT IDENTIFIERS IN CONSUMER
FINANCIAL REGULATION
BY DANIEL CARPENTER* AND PATRICIA A. McCoy+
For decades in the United States, policymakers and pundits
touted financial innovation as an unquestioned good. Perhaps the most
prominent proponent of this mindset in recent years was former Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, who championed Schumpeter's
theory of creative destruction as making way for technological change.'
Greenspan was so enamored of Schumpeterian economics that he used
his time at the Fed to single-handedly pursue a conscious policy of
deregulation in order to encourage financial innovations, ranging from
subprime credit to mortgage-backed securities and credit default
swaps. 2
Of course, many financial innovations over the years have
inured to the benefit of consumers and society. The checking account,
which state banks pioneered in the late nineteenth century to evade the
federal tax on state bank notes, is one, joined by the automated teller
machine, the money market fund, and the debit card in more recent
times. 3 As the 2008 financial crisis revealed, however, some financial
* Allie S. Freed Professor of Government, Harvard University and Director of Social
Sciences, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard. For research support, Carpenter
acknowledges the Alfred Sloan Foundation (through the Russell Sage and Alfred Sloan
Foundation Program in Behavioral Economics and Consumer Finance) and the Edmond J.
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Baker, Ed Balleisen, Steven Croley, Danny Goroff, Melissa Jacoby, James Kwak, David
Moss, Saule T. Omarova, Kevin Schulman, Michael Stebbins, Elizabeth Warren, and
audiences at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (August 2010) and
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1. ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 250-
52 (2007).
2. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 189-205 (2011). Greenspan was also
enamored with the theories of Ayn Rand, id. at 189-90.
3. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the
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innovations, if left to run rampant, can inflict serious negative
externalities on the financial system and on society as a whole. Private-
label mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and
over-the-counter credit default swaps all came under scrutiny and new
regulation in the wake of the financial crisis for exactly that type of
harm.
The question for Congress and for policymakers, then, is how to
harness the potential good from financial innovations while curbing
their potential harm. 4 It is important for the government to operate with
a deft touch to avoid stifling new financial products that are welfare-
enhancing. At the same time, the government can no longer afford to
hide its head in the sand: it must henceforth monitor financial
innovations in view of the potentially grave harm to consumers and to
the financial system as a whole that some of those innovations can pose.
Outside of the consumer finance arena, government regulators
use a variety of regulatory techniques to reduce the potential harm from
technological innovation. The Food and Drug Administration, for
example, does not permit pharmaceuticals to be sold without exhaustive
clinical trials and prior product approval.s The Consumer Product
Safety Commission eschews prior product approval, but it does monitor
consumer products for hazards and recalls products that violate
mandatory safety standards or that are defective and pose a substantial
risk of injury. 6  Meanwhile, state insurance regulators commonly
Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681 (1988); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J.
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 18-19 (1963);
BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 572-604, 728-34 (1957); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank
Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1153-54 (1990).
4. On regulation of financial innovations generally, see, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, The
Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55 (2011);
Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REv. 657 (2012); Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and
the Management and Regulation of Financial Institutions, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 461 (1995);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U.L. REv. 211
(2009); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 BOsTON U.L. REV. I
(2010).
5. See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 21-22 (2010); Food & Drug Admin.,
Development and Approval Process, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2012).
6. See, e.g., CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 1-21 (2012), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
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require insurance underwriters to file "forms" for new insurance
products that they plan to market. For some types of insurance in some
states, insurers must obtain prior regulatory approval before marketing
new products. The more common trends today in insurance regulation,
however, are file-and-use and use-and-file systems.7
Applying pre-approvals and recalls to financial innovations is
not straightforward. For clinical trials to be effective, they would have
to be conducted over the entire business cycle, resulting in protracted
delays. This is one reason why insurance regulation has increasingly
migrated away from pre-approval requirements. Similarly, in federal
regulation of consumer finance, when products have been banned, it has
been through statutory enactment or full notice-and-comment
rulemaking (and even the latter is highly controversial), not through
recalls.
Mindful of these problems and this history, in this Article we
propose a far less intrusive, market-compatible method for monitoring
financial innovations without blocking them: data collection and
analysis using unique product identifiers. A central hypothesis of this
essay is that the beneficial and harmful effects of financial innovations
could be better understood if regulators and third parties could harness
product identifiers to identify product-specific risks. Furthermore,
product identifiers need to be available to the public as well as to the
government in order to enlist the considerable resources and insights of
independent, outside researchers to improve the monitoring of consumer
and systemic financial risk.
Our proposal builds on a number of key reforms mandated by
Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act8 in 2010. In the systemic risk provisions of Title I of
Dodd-Frank, for example, Congress created the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) and charged it with identifying and
monitoring risks to the financial stability of the United States. 9 To
discharge its monitoring functions, FSOC, working through the new
Office of Financial Research, can require financial companies to submit
/PageFiles/123357/201 Irpt.pdf.
7. See, e.g., 2 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW § 10.1 (2009).
8. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a)(1)(A), (b) (2012).
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periodic and other reports to assess the extent to which a financial
activity poses a threat to the financial stability of the United States.10
Similarly, in Dodd-Frank, Congress instructed the newly created
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to "monitor for risks to
consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial products
or services, including developments in markets for such products or
services."'1
The monitoring that Congress contemplated in Dodd-Frank
cannot be adequately performed without the ability to identify distinct
financial products and isolate their effects. Fortunately, creating
product identifiers increases monitoring abilities substantially at a
relatively low cost. Once reasonable fixed costs have been incurred,
databases with product identifiers are relatively cheap to maintain, and,
if properly deployed and presented to citizens in a user-friendly manner,
they can assist regulatory policy in at least three ways: (1) by improving
regulatory information and policy so that actions focus on the products
with the largest risk profiles, both in terms of risk to consumers and to
the financial system as a whole, (2) by inducing financial services
providers to monitor their products' risks more carefully, and (3) by
improving consumer information so as to reduce information
asymmetries between producers and consumers (and between regulators
and consumers), thereby allowing consumers to choose products that
better fit their needs and ability to bear risk. We examine these
possibilities and discuss features of risk databases that permit prediction
of product-specific risk profiles in the financial services sector, even in
cases where product innovation may change the available set of
consumer alternatives on a regular and expected basis.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we canvass the
growth of publicly searchable federal databases on consumer product
safety. 12 Part II examines the properties of these existing systems and
their limitations. 13 Many of these limitations are well recognized among
observers and participants in the regulatory regime but have yet to be
remedied or addressed due to political, fiscal, or agenda constraints. In
10. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(d)(3)(A) (2012).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(1) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 551 1(c)(3), 5512(c)(4)(B)(ii)
(2012).
12. See infra Part 1.
13. See infra Part II.
198 [Vol. 18
PRODUCT IDENTIFIERS
Part III, we explain how product identifiers significantly improve the
analytical power of monitoring in several respects.14 These identifiers
do so by facilitating linkage of multiple databases to permit analysis of
the interaction of one type of financial product with another, by
reducing the costs of that linkage, and by reducing error in the
identification and classification of new financial products. Part IV
proposes a new system of product identifiers in the regulation of
consumer finance to improve the governance and monitoring of
consumer financial innovations.15  Finally, Part V provides a brief
conclusion. 16
I. THE GROWTH IN PUBLICLY SEARCHABLE FEDERAL DATABASES
ON CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
A variety of regulatory policies attempt to monitor risks
associated with consumer products. These range from the consumer
product safety apparatus in the United States to state and federal
automobile safety regimes, to risk regulation for insurance and
consumer finance and pre-approval for pharmaceutical products. The
academic rationales for these policies are varied, though few of the
policies enacted in regulation are or were enacted for the ex post
rationalizations that scholars give them.17 Many are enacted in the name
of "consumer protection" and "safety," and arguments about
information asymmetries between producer and consumer usually figure
into the enactment and design of many such institutions.
A growing number of federal regulatory agencies govern
markets in which product innovation constantly alters the set of objects
and firms regulated and in which risks to consumers vary heavily by
product in their incidence, harm and risk. In recent years, a number of
these regimes have begun to host large information systems dedicated to
reporting, tracking and aggregating consumer risk experiences. At some
level, such systems have characterized markets in advanced
industrialized nations for decades if not centuries. Better business
bureaus and public health agencies have long kept complaint files on
14. See infra Part ill.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See generally CARPENTER, supra note 5, at 35-45, 73-117, 228-97.
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different businesses.' 8 Yet the rise of the Internet and electronic and
statistical technologies has fundamentally transformed the possibilities
of these databases. In particular, electronic databases may permit
statistical prediction (and perhaps causal analysis) of product-specific
risks with some precision, given the large sample sizes contained in
these databases.
In a limited number of these areas, agencies have established
databases, some of which are open to the public, that allow reporting of
product-specific attributes and risks. The most prominent of these
databases are ones spearheaded by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Food and Drug
Administration. Users' ability to analyze risk posed by specific
products to consumers by discrete product attributes varies
considerably, depending on the particular database.
A. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
The most prominent effort in the United States to create a
consumer product safety database has occurred at the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC), which established the Consumer Product
Safety Information Database in 2010.19 The Commission created the
database pursuant to a rulemaking authorized by Section 212 of the
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, which directs the
Commission to establish and maintain a database on the safety of
consumer products, and other products and substances regulated by the
Commission, that is publicly available, searchable, and accessible
through the Commission's website. 20 In May 2010, the Commission
released a proposed rule with the outlines of a database in mind.
Particular issues, namely the permeability of the database to
manipulation by one company at the expense of another, split the
18. Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force ofLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1003 (1979).
19. CPSC, Publicly Available Consumer Product Safety Information Database: Final
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 76832 (Dec. 9, 2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1102 (2013)). In a similar
vein, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created a Household Products
Database that allows readers to search online for safety information on household products
by brand name and manufacturer for health effects and ingredients. Household Products
Database, HHS, http://householdproducts.nlm.nih.gov/index.htm (last updated Jan., 2013).
20. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, §
212(a), 122 Stat. 3048 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(a)(1) (2012)).
200 [Vol. 18
PRODUCT IDENTIFIERS
Commission on a three-to-two vote in November 2010, with majority
Democrats casting the necessary votes to approve the final rule and
minority Republicans voting against it.2 1
The raw components of the Consumer Product Safety Database
have existed for decades in the form of consumer product incident
reports. The Commission maintains a database of these reports.22
Complaints come to the database from several sources, including the
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), which
aggregates data from hospital emergency rooms on product-related
injuries, death certificates, and the Injury or Potential Injury Incident
(IPII) database, which includes data from what are known as Medical
Examiners and Coroners Program (MECAP) reports. Once aggregated,
these reports were always publicly accessible in the minimal sense that
citizens could file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to
obtain them. Yet the costs of access for any one citizen are prohibitive,
and the FOIA process has long been known to move slowly, especially
as it is overburdened by lawyers using it for the purpose of discovery.
What is more, even if querying the database were cheaper, aggregation
of the reports would be prohibitively costly, which is one reason why
many public interest research groups and third parties like Consumer
Reports have been unable to do it systematically. 23
The CPSC's database addresses these problems by providing
publicly available and immediately searchable web-based data on
reports of harm and recall notices involving consumer products and
21. Andrew Martin, Partisan Rift Mires Product Safety Database Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2010, at Bl; Andrew Martin, In Split Vote, Safety Panel Approves Database for
Consumer Complaints, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2010, at B4; see CPSC, Publicly Available
Consumer Product Safety Information Database: Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 76832 (Dec. 9,
2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1102 (2013)). The National Association of Manufacturers
sided with the Republican Commissioners-Nancy Nord and former Commissioner Anne
Northrup-on this issue, while consumer safety advocates in public interest research groups
tended to side with the Democratic Commissioners, including chair Inez Tenenbaum.
22. "For several decades, the Commission has gathered and maintained a database of
consumer complaints known as consumer product incident reports involving a description of
incidents related to the use of consumer products that fall within the scope of the
Commission's jurisdiction." CPSC, Publicly Available Consumer Product Safety
Information Database: Proposed Rule, 75 Fed Reg. 29156 (May 24, 2010) (codified at 16
C.F.R. § 1102 (2013)).
23. Memorandum from Mary Kelsey James & Ming Zhu, CPSC staff, to the CPSC &
Todd A. Stevenson (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/90803/dbfollowup.pdf
(regarding the "Publicly Available Consumer Product Safety Information Database
Proposed Final Rule").
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other products and substances regulated by the CPSC. The breadth and
depth of this database far exceeds data currently available in any other
country. The database allows members of the public to search a
publicly available CPSC website for incident reports and recalls by a
variety of product-specific variables, including consumer product type,
brand and model, and manufacturer. 24
Electronic incident reporting and electronic search are two of
the central architectural components of the Commission's database.
Now that the online database is completed, it is much easier for citizens
to file complaints about products. 25 In addition, it is now possible for
any user with an Internet connection to search the database for a
particular product. 26
B. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Part of the inspiration for the Consumer Product Safety
Commission's database was the assemblage of vehicle accident and
recall reports compiled and maintained by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). For several decades, the
Administration has maintained data on accidents and recalls. These
data are sufficiently fine-grained as to permit analysis of the effects of
recalls. 27 NHTSA maintains these data in a large, publicly searchable
database of vehicle accidents and recalls, with detailed information on
all individual recalls since 1966, housed at the Department of
Transportation's National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA).28
The data include a variety of product-specific variables, including
"model year, beginning and ending dates of manufacturing, potential
number of units affected, potential number of units defective, recall
initiator, the number of units corrected, hazard category (only up to
24. See SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV, http://saferproducts.gov/Default.aspx (last visited May
25, 2013); see also CPSC, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 212 OF THE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2008: IMPLEMENTATION OF A
SEARCHABLE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY INCIDENT DATABASE (SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV)
(2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov//PageFiles/127269/cpsia212.pdf.
25. See File a Report, CPSC, https://www.saferproducts.gov/CPSRMSPublic/
Incidents/Reportlncident.aspx (last visited May 25, 2013).
26. See SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV, supra note 24.
27. Yong Kyun Bae & Hugo Benitez-Silva, Do Vehicle Recalls Reduce the Number of
Accidents? The Case of the U.S. Car Market, 30 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 821, 823,
827-28 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. Car Market].
28. See SAFERCAR.GOv, http://www.safercar.gov/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
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2001), summaries of defects, possible consequences, and the correction
required to eliminate the defects." 29
The number of vehicle recalls is large and has jumped
appreciably in the last two decades; "after a record of over 30 million
cars recalled in 2004, in the last few years it has consistently reached
between 15 and 17 million, and in 2010 alone 20 million cars were
recalled."30 NHTSA obtains data on accidents from Police Accident
Reports (PARs) collected through the General Estimates System (GES),
which dates from 1988. The GES is produced from a nationally
representative sample, culled from approximately six million police-
reported crashes annually. 31 For these accidents, the GES data include
information on the severity of injuries for those involved, as well as
information on vehicle models and vehicle-year models. 32
In two interesting and innovative papers, Bae and Benitez-Silva
adduce panel-data observational evidence that vehicle recalls reduce
both the number and severity of accidents.33 On severity of crashes,
their estimates suggest that "the probability of resulting in an
incapacitating injury goes down from 7.97% to 3.73% during the year
after the recall" for recalled cars but not for non-recalled cars, and that
for recalled models compared to non-recalled models, "the probability
of resulting in fatal injury also goes down (0.0054 vs. 0.0016)."34 The
results are undoubtedly driven by a small number of events, but if
correct, they provide a rationale for information safety databases. First,
they suggest that the product identifiers in the current system of vehicle
safety are working to produce benefits by providing a platform for the
quick removal of defective cars from the roads. There is also evidence
suggestive for the hypothesis that, for recalled cars that remain on the
road, drivers may drive more carefully for those that remain on the road.
29. US. Car Market, supra note 27, at 828.
30. Yong Kyun Bae & Hugo-Benitez Silva, The Effects ofAutomobile Recalls on the
Severity of Accidents, 51 EcoN. INQUIRY 1232, 1232 (2013) [hereinafter Automobile
Recalls].
31. See National Automotive Sampling System (NASS), NHTSA,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/NASS (last visited May 25, 2013) [hereinafter NASS].
32. For description of these data, we have relied heavily upon U.S. Car Market, supra
note 27, at 833-34, and Automobile Recalls, supra note 29, at 1232. See also Safety Recall
Compendium, NHTSA, DEFECTS AND RECALL INFO. ANALYSIS Div. (2001), http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/documents/recompendium.pdf.; NASS, supra note 31.
33. U.S. Car Market, supra note 27; Automobile Recalls, supra note 30.
34. Automobile Recalls, supra note 30, at 1247.
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It is clear that this effect would not be possible but for product
identification-through recalls-and is understood, at least implicitly
if not explicitly, by consumers who are drivers.
The results of Bae and Benitez-Silva similarly point to an
important limitation of information systems in the realm of
transportation policy and auto safety. Each car in the United States is
identifiable by a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). If recalls tracked
the VINs of the cars that were returned during a recall, then
policymakers would be able to monitor the fraction of recalled vehicles
that have been returned and repaired. Furthermore, insurance companies
would be able to incorporate the information into their pricing behavior,
rewarding drivers who returned their recalled cars for inspection and
remedy. Due to the opposition of vehicle manufacturers in the 1970s,
however, a proposal for attaching VINs to recalls was rejected by the
Administration. Bae and Benitez-Silva (2010, 2011) see the availability
of VIN data for recalls as a welfare-improving and relatively cheap
policy measure.35
C. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Since its inception in July 2011, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) has developed two publicly searchable
databases offering product-specific information. The Credit Card
Agreement Database, launched in 2012, allows the public to search the
CFPB's website for credit card agreements, either by issuer or by
specific language in the agreement. 36 The public can also download all
of those agreements for further analysis. One drawback of the database
is that credit card issuers contribute agreements to the dataset strictly on
a voluntary basis. Accordingly, it does not encompass the universe of
credit card agreements and is likely to be subject to reporting bias.
Furthermore, credit card issuers are permitted by law in many respects
to amend their agreements on an ongoing basis and in ways that are
35. See, e.g., id. at 1234.
36. Credit Card Agreement Database, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-
cards/agreements/ (last visited May 23, 2013); Marla Blow, Launching the College Credit
Card Agreement Database, CFPB BLOG (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/launching-the-college-credit-card-agreement-
database/.
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tailored to individual consumers.3 7  This chameleon-like feature of
credit card contracts means that the product features of a given
customer's credit card are ever-changing. The credit card agreements in
the database cannot and do not capture this dynamic element.
Subsequently, in 2013, the CFPB opened its electronically
searchable Consumer Complaint Database to the public, containng data
at inception on more than 90,000 complaints about credit cards,
mortgages, student loans, bank accounts, services, and other consumer
loans.38 Among other things, the database allows users to download,
sort, and visualize complaint data. However, the dataset has a number
of limitations. Chief among those is that consumer finance products are
only sorted by relatively crude product features such as fixed versus
adjustable rates, without the additional, granular data that are needed to
analyze the true product features at issue in any given complaint.
Similarly, the data come solely from unverified consumer complaints.
While those complaints are a potentially rich source of data, they are
prone to error and bias in reporting.
D. The Department of the Treasury
In Section 1483 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act,39 Congress required the Department of the
Treasury to make loan-level data on mortgage modification requests
under the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program publicly available
within sixty days after the deadline for reporting. The Treasury has
done so by posting downloadable periodic datasets to its website. Each
dataset contains loan-leval mortgage information for each trial and
permanent modification applications evaluated under MHA's Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), including those that are
37. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN.
L. REv. 1, 10 (2008). While the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009 or CARD Act places some restrictions on such changes, many other types of
changes are still permitted. See, e.g., CARD Act Factsheet, CFPB, available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb20 11-factsheet/ (last visited
May 26, 2013).
38. Consumer Complaint Database, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
complaintdatabase/ (last visited May 23, 2013); Scott Pluta, Releasing Complaint Data
about Credit Cards, Mortgages, Student Loans, Bank Accounts, Services, and Other
Consumer Loans, CFPB BLOG (March 28, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
blog/category/credit-cards/.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 5219b (2012).
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approved, denied, and cancelled. The data fields contain product-
specific information, including the product type, term, interest rate, and
monthly payment information, both pre- and post-modification.40
E. The Food and Drug Administration's MedWatch System
Perhaps the most advanced system of post-market safety and
consumer experience is the MedWatch system established by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 4 1 Like other agencies, the FDA
has been collecting Adverse Event Reports (AERs) from manufacturers
of medical products and physicians since the 1960s, 42 but the
inauguration of an electronic and publicly accessible database in 1993
created a much richer, more accurate, and more comprehensive system
of information. For each drug for each month, the MedWatch system
aggregates all adverse event reports and includes information about the
date of incident, patient gender and age, and the severity of the incident,
among other variables.
AERs are not searchable publicly without a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request. Members of the public, however, can
search MedWatch on the FDA's website for safety alerts by product. In
addition, the FDA has begun an electronic notification system, based
upon MedWatch, that transmits updates from the MedWatch system to
physicians and patients, including by smartphone and by Twitter. 43
AERs lack sufficient detail for many inferences, and there is
evidence of substantial reporting bias. Yet regulatory officials and drug
safety specialists maintain that, combined with epidemiologic studies,
these reports can serve as data for hypothesis formation. The
40. See Making Home Affordable File Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS. (Jan. 31,
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/MHA%20Data%2OFile%2OSummary-.new.pdf; Making Home
Affordable Appendix C, Data File Data Dictionary v3.0, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., at C-8
(Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/MHA%20Data%2OFile%2OAppendix%20C%20v3.0%20FINA
L.pdf.
41. MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program,
FDA, www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/default.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2013).
42. See CARPENTER, supra note 5, at 591-92; ARTHUR A. DAEMMRICH,
PHARMACOPOLITICS: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 116-50
(2004).
43. Subscribe to MedWatch Alerts, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch
/ucm228488.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2011).
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hypotheses then can be fed into randomized trials or more tightly
controlled epidemiological studies to produce more internally valid
estimates of product risk.44 For example, these data have been used in
the analysis of pharmaceutical risk by Mary K. Olson, 45 among others.
What differentiates the MedWatch system from other product
information systems is that in the United States, each drug is uniquely
identified by its New Drug Application (NDA) number. This is so even
for generic versions of a molecule that long ago lost its patent
protection. Hence, more precise attributions of product risk can be made
at the micro level (by physicians, pharmacists, drug companies and
patients themselves), and macro-level inferences can be made about the
relative observed risks of drugs. The unique identifier is a function of
the FDA's gatekeeping power over the American pharmaceutical
market (and by extension from this highly profitable market, much of
the global pharmaceutical marketplace). In order to be sold in interstate
commerce in the United States, each new drug must pass through the
new drug application process, at the beginning of which it is assigned a
unique NDA number that serves as an identifier in regulatory and
pharmacoepidemiological work. There is a large literature on the effects
of product recalls and warnings that is beyond summary here, but it is
sufficient for now to note that all drug product withdrawals and labeling
decisions correspond to NDA numbers.
There is reason to believe that efforts like these will continue, in
part because policymakers in the United States have embarked upon a
transparency and disclosure initiative affecting numerous levels of
government,4 6 and in part because other nations' regulators have also
begun to call for greater disclosure of risks. In just one example of that
trend, six federal agencies with vastly different jurisdictions joined
forces in 2004 to create an online "one stop shop" permitting the public
to search for U.S. recalls of foods, medicines, cosmetics, motor
vehicles, car seats, environmental products, boats, and other consumer
44. See Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Postmarketing Surveillance and
Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future Needs, 281 J. AM. MEDICAL
Ass'N 824, 828 (1999); Robert Temple, Meta-analysis and Epidemiologic Studies in Drug
Development and Postmarketing Surveillance, 281 J. AM. MEDICALAss'N 841, 841 (1999).
45. Mary K. Olson, The Risk We Bear: The Effects of Review Speed and Industry User
Fees on New Drug Safety, 27 J. HEALTH ECoN. 175 (2008).
46. See, e.g., ABOuTDATA.GOv, http://www.data.gov/about (last visited May 26,
2013).
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products government-wide.47 Congress has also expressly mandated the
creation of other publicly searchable databases in the consumer safety
area.48 The robustness of many of these systems is limited, however, by
the lack of granular data allowing researchers to pinpoint the effect of a
product's exact features and to quantify joint effects of the use of
multiple products on consumer welfare.
II. CONSUMER PRODUCT RISK AND PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
Despite the rise of these information systems, the kinds of
predictive databases most commonly used by risk analysts are ill-
equipped to address some of the most important sources of consumer
risk. In particular, the ability to analyze the interaction between
someone's use of one type of product with their use of another type is in
its infancy. There are examples of multiple-product databases in retail
finance (e.g., the study of multiple credit card instruments in Gross and
SouleleS49 and studies of multiple products using credit reporting
agency data50 ), yet outside of medicine these examples are rare.
47. See Your Online Resource for Recalls, WWW.RECALLS.GOV, http://www.recalls.gov
(last visited May 23, 2013); News Release, CPSC, Government Website Now Provides
Instantaneous Information on Recalls (Nov. 16, 2004),
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2005/Government-Website-Now-
Provides-Instantaneous-Information-on-Recalls-/. The six agencies are the CPSC
(consumer products), FDA (food, medicines, and cosmetics), the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (meat and poultry), NHTSA (motor vehicles and car seats), the Environmental
Protection Agency (pesticides and vehicle emissions), and the U.S. Coast Guard (boats and
boating safety).
48. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012) (requiring public disclosure of home mortgage
data under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act); 21 U.S.C. § 2013 (2012) (requiring
creation of a searchable database on the effects of methamphetamine use and treatment
options); 21 U.S.C. § 2103 (2012) (directing the FDA to create a searchable database of
recalled human food and of recalled pet food).
49. David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest
Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 149 (2002).
50. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Brevoort & Cheryl R. Cooper, Foreclosure's Wake: The
Credit Experiences of Individuals following Foreclosure (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ.
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2010-59, 2010) (analyzing effect of foreclosure on
subsequent delinquencies affecting other types of consumer loans); Ronel Elul, et al., What
"Triggers" Mortgage Default?, 100 AM. EcON. REV. 490 (2010) (exploring joint propensity
to default on mortgages and credit cards). In addition, the forthcoming National Mortgage
Database will allow federal officials and possibly outside researchers to study, among other
things, emerging trends in the joint use of different consumer finance products, including
home mortgages, auto loans, and student loans. See Press Release, CFPB, Federal Housing
Finance Agency and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to partner on development of
National Mortgage Database (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
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Without the ability to track the use of different types of products by
individual consumers, regulators, policymakers, and analysts are unable
to understand or measure the following types of risks:
* Superadditive risk specific to individual consumers:
Superadditive risk arises when the joint distribution of consumer risk
differs materially from the aggregated product-specific distributions of
risks. 1 Consumers may happen to use more than one product at a time
and the joint distribution of risk from some bundles of products may not
be predictable from the marginal distributions of the bundled products
themselves. An obvious example comes in contraindicated medications
such as the clinical recommendations against lithium use with
anglotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, the proscription of
monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAGls) with dextromethorphan, or the
added risk of aspirin for pain management to patients taking warfarin or
other blood thinners. The suffocation risk from a certain kind of blanket
or toy may be raised when the infant is placed in a certain kind of crib
that limits motion or creates higher probabilities of limbs getting caught
in the bars or corners. Many of these product interactions are well
known, but some of them are dependent on consumer type, and there
are likely many such reactions that remain unknown. Superadditive risk
is rarely if ever studied by economists in consumer finance.
* Superadditive risk across consumers: Superadditive risk can
also arise where one consumer's use of a dangerous product is
positively correlated with harm to other consumers. This can occur in
the distribution phase, where the growing market dominance of a risky
product crowds out the availability of a safer product. For instance,
during the housing bubble that precipitated the financial crisis of 2008,
the low initial monthly payments on relatively risky interest-only and
option adjustable-rate mortgages cut into the market share of fixed-rate
loans.52 This can also occur in the use phase, where one person's use of
pressreleases/federal-housing-finance-agency-and-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-to-
partner-on-development-of-national-mortgage-database/.
51. See James S. Koopman, Interaction Between Discrete Causes, 113 Am. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 716 (1981); Tyler J. VanderWeele & James Robins, Biologic Interactions
and Their Identification (COBRA Preprint Series, Paper No. 12, 2006), available at
http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra.
52. See, e.g., Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems, Future
Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I1 Ith
Cong. 3-11 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, George J. and Helen M. England
Professor of Law, U. Conn. Sch. of L.), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
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a risky consumer product can have adverse spillover effects increasing
the likelihood of harm to other consumers from use of the same or
similar products. For example, when the sharp rise in delinquencies
from subprime and Alt-A mortgages pushed down U.S. home prices
significantly starting in the first quarter of 2007, other homeowners who
had been current on their mortgages became delinquent due to job loss
from the recession, combined with being underwater on their
mortgages. 53 In the financial arena, this type of correlated risk can give
rise to concern about the stability of the financial system.
* Marginal propensity toward use of additional products:
Accumulation of experienced risk with one set of products may lead to
utilization of others. A consumer who has accumulated debt on one
credit card may attempt to transfer the debt to another set of debt
instruments (including credit cards with different terms or a consumer
loan). A patient on atypical antipsychotics or certain forms of
antidepressant may gain so much weight as to induce metabolic
syndrome, requiring the prescription of oral antidiabetics. There is in
general little information about the joint distribution of risk with these
products.
* Joint distribution of consumer products: Certain products may
be marketed together in bundles, or the geographic availability of one
product may be differentially associated with another (payday loans and
certain kinds of mortgage instruments).
* Bespoke products: In certain areas, the features of consumer
products are increasingly being tailored to the individual consumer,
which can affect the associated risk. Advances in DNA analysis, for
example, are leading to individualized drugs tailored to specific
patients' genetic make-ups. While this movement is in its infancy, it is
expected to gain steam, bringing with it the growing potential for
unknown risks. This trend is considerably further along in the retail
consumer finance sector, where advances in credit scoring models and
risk-based pricing-and in other, sometimes illegal, ways to segment
consumers-have spurred the individually tailored loan features,
papers.cfn?abstract id= 1367977.
53. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, The Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons
Learned 21 (Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2254672.
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affecting price terms and other product features as well. 54  This
individualization can reduce or increase the risk profile of the specific
instruments involved.
* Dynamic nature of consumer product features: In an
extension of the bespoke trend, financial product providers may draft
their contracts to allow for revisions to those contracts on an ongoing
basis. This is particularly common in the area of open-end consumer
credit, such as credit cards and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs),
where the credit line may be open and used for decades, over a gamut of
changing competitive conditions, business cycles and life circumstances
of the user. For these products, a product's initial characteristics can
and do morph over time and so do the associated consumer risks.
Moreover, in this era of "big data," servicers often use their
observations of consumer use and performance to tailor these
modifications to individual consumers, with some becoming more likely
to receive certain types of unilateral amendments than others.55  A
similar bespoke trend can be seen in the differential marketing of "add-
on" products, such as credit insurance, or refinancing offers, according
to a consumer's individual credit profile. 56
Despite their increasing and potentially widespread use of risk
and regulatory databases, it may be difficult to satisfy the conditions
necessary for researcher to be able to study these important types of
risk. A number of difficulties may arise in the utilization of consumer
risk databases (CRDs). For example, consumer risk databases may
inefficiently reveal risk information, due to the lack of product
identifiers or other data. Similarly, CRDs may be subject to selection or
sorting bias because certain consumer types may be more likely to
utilize certain products. The resulting distribution of observed risk may
result more from consumers than from the products themselves.
Product identifiers can help identify-and rule out-suspected sources
of that risk.
54. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1255, 1278-79 (2002).
55. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 10. Cf Daniel M. Schwarcz,
Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1277-1317 (2011)
(analyzing differences in personal lines insurance policies).
56. See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Protecting Consumers from Add-On Insurance
Products: New Lessons for Insurance Regulation from Behavioral Economics (U. PA. Inst.
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-1, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2199569.
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Product identifiers can also aid in the measurement of the other
types of risk just discussed. They can allow the estimation of joint
marketing strategies and superadditive risk-both for individual
consumers and for the financial system as a whole-by permitting the
linkage of databases to identify the concurrent use of discrete financial
products. With the use of panel data, these same linkages can permit
researchers to measure the marginal propensity toward the use of
additional products by detecting the sequential use of different financial
products. Product identifiers can also help analyze the trend toward
individually customized financial products with changing features and
the consumer welfare implications of that trend.
III. CONSUMER PRODUCT DATABASES AS NETWORKED INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
The databases described earlier have a number of components in
common. They aggregate information from reports by consumers,
providers, or third parties. They aggregate these reports by
appropriately chosen categories and then make the results of
aggregation (in the sense of lists or statistical summaries) available to
end users and in some cases to the public. Regulators sometimes also
premise warning systems and even product recalls and withdrawals on
these databases; the information extends beyond analytic utility and
quite clearly informs decisions that impose costs upon firms and
consumers.
For purposes of representing relationships among databases, and
among consumers and various products (including bundles of products
owned or used simultaneously), this Section describe a model of
consumer risk databases.57 We start by examining the most common
databases in financial regulation, which are single-product databases,
and noting their limitations. Next, we discuss how to overcome those
limitations through linking databases and the associated problem of
linkage's high potential cost. Finally, we explain how the introduction
57. This model extends and, to some extent, generalizes the work of those in
informatics and computer science who have considered these systems in other policy
contexts. See, e.g., Mark D. Flood, Embracing Change: Financial Informatics and Risk
Analytics, 9 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 243 (2009); Ting Yu, et al., PRUNES: An Efficient and
Complete Strategy for Automated Trust Negotiation over the Internet, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 7TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (2000).
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of product identifiers can reduce that cost substantially while also
minimizing errors in the identification and classification of different
financial products.
A. Single-Product Databases and Their Limitations
Ideally, a consumer risk dataset would observe, for any given
point in time, the risk outcome for every individual consumer for every
product that he or she used. We can refer to this ideal dataset as the
aggregate risk profile. Normally, however, reality falls short of this
ideal. For any regulated sector, few if any data sources encompass an
exhaustive representation of the aggregate risk profile. Instead, there
are various data sources that most often are limited to a single product.
Some of these data sources may be publicly available, either for free or
for a price; others are not available to public users apart from the
government; and still others are out of reach of both the public and the
government, absent a subpoena or similar compelled process. Examples
of the latter might include product health provider data on patients
within a given plan who are prescribed a certain drug or bank-based
data on credit card accounts. Analysts in investment or regulatory
applications will often combine these databases, either examining a
larger consumer population than they could have with just one of the
databases, or linking consumer characteristics, market characteristics, or
product characteristics from multiple data sources.
Take, for instance, a dataset such as a consumer complaint
database that represents the risk experience of a given subpopulation,
say the population of consumers some of whom who have defaulted on
some kind of loan or mortgage, or who have some kind of credit card
and may have filed for bankruptcy, or the population of individuals who
have been involved in car accidents. A key feature of this dataset is that
it possesses considerable information about individual citizens or
consumers, but no information (unless implicit and extractable through
learning) about the products being used. The only situation in which this
dataset is sufficient to comprise the aggregate risk profile is when
individuals are using one product and one product only. Of, course
comparative risk analysis across products is impossible in this case.
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B. Linking Datasets and Their Costs
Given the number of data sources to be linked and the number
of analysts (including third party groups, consumers themselves, and
possibly regulators or investors) wishing to link them, establishing a
system to link them requires a myriad of linkages to connect each
analyst to each data source.
Figure 1.
Sources.58
The Multiplicity of Linkages Among Analysts and Data
Data Sources Analysts
This system entails considerable expense, which can be broken
down into two major costs. One cost involves the expense of designing
the system to link each analyst to each data source. The other cost
entails the expense of actually accomplishing each of those multiple
linkages. The important point here is that the total costs do not increase
additively (i.e., by the number of data sources plus the number of
58. Flood, supra note 57, at 246.
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analysts). Rather, the total cost increases multiplicatively (i.e., by the
number of data sources times the number of analysts). 59 For example,
Figure 1 assumes that four analysts are each trying to link three data
sources. If c denotes a unit of cost, the total cost of those linkages will
be 4c x 3c = 12c, not 4c + 3c = 7c. Consequently, with each additional
analyst and/or data source that is linked, the total cost will rise
geometrically.
Figure 2. Example of the Effect of the Number of Data Sources and
Analysts on Cost of Linkage 60
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C. Facilitating Linkage Through a Product Identifier
In consumer finance, as well as other areas of product safety, an
important aim of risk analysis is to predict the joint distribution of risk,
conditioned upon the consumer's utilization of more than one product at
a time. As discussed above, databases that allow for this type of risk
estimation are rare. Furthermore, linking multiple databases to permit
59. See Flood, supra note 57. As a matter of strategic institutional design, the question
of how many analysts there are and what contracts govern them is examined in Sean
Gailmard & John W. Patty, Stovepiping, 25 J. THEORETICAL PoL. 388 (2013) and John W.
Patty, The Politics ofBiased Information, 71 J. PoL. 385 (2009).
60. For purposes of illustration, this example assumes that the number of data sources
and the number of analysts are the same.
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estimation of joint distribution of risk is extremely costly and error-
prone. The task, then, is how to harness the analytical power of linked
databases while reducing the costs of linkage and errors in
classification. Product identifiers that attach a unique code to every
different product can accomplish both of these objectives.
1. Reducing the Costs of Linkage
For purposes of risk analysis, product identifiers offer two
related advantages. The first is that a product identifier can help reduce
costs by providing a common intermediate link-otherwise known as a
numeraire typology6 1-for linking various data sources and analytics
(think of multiple banking regulators linking static loan origination data,
credit bureau data, and neighborhood demographic data for use in
multivariate regressions).
Figure 3. The Effect of Introduction of a Unique Product Identifier
in Streamlining Linkages. 62
Data Sources Analysts
Unique Product Identifler
61. See, e.g., Flood, supra note 57, at 246.
62. Flood, supra note 57, at 246.
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Doing this reduces the rise in costs from adding analysts or
datasets from a geometric increase to a much more affordable additive
increase (see Figure 2).63 Comparing Figure 1 to Figure 3, for instance,
by introducing a product identifier, the number of linkages needed drops
from 12 to 7. Thus, adding an identifier is a powerful way to reduce the
cost of linking databases in most instances.
As an example of the power of product identifiers in this regard,
let us imagine a pharmacoepidemiologist trying to examine whether one
mental health drug is associated with greater liver toxicity than another,
or is associated with more seizures than another. And let us further
imagine a world without product identifiers (no NDA numbers), but
with manufacturer-specific databases on the experience of users with
their products. In order to assemble a comparative database,
independent researchers would, in short order, experience costs that
increase exponentially with the number of products examined. If a set of
ten third-party psychiatrists (for example, different offices within the
FDA, or various universities, or international health agencies) wanted to
move from examining the post-market experience of five different
psychotropic drugs to fifteen, the linkage costs to society would
increase one-hundred fold. With a product identifier, however, the costs
would increase only tenfold. If data assembly required repeated
querying of data sources, as is common, these cost differentials would
only magnify. At some basic level, there would be vast duplication of
effort unless the various analysts could coordinate upon a product
identifier, which would require the solution of a collective action
problem and the institutional problem of assigning the identifier.
2. Error Reduction
A skeptical reader might object at this point that in the twenty-
first century, linkages like these can be made approximate even without
a product identifier. But a product identifier has a second powerful
63. For a full exposition of the underlying mathematical model, see Daniel Carpenter,
Product Identifiers in Consumer Regulation: Notes Toward a Theory, with Applications to
Retail Financial Epidemiology (Working Paper, Nov. 15, 2011).
2013]1 2 17
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
advantage over linkages performed without an identifier, which is
substantial reduction in the propensity toward errors.
One could describe the set of products taken by their common
trade name or chemical name and, even without an NDA identifier, use
textual strings to identify the various drugs. Experience with the
MEDWATCH system suggests that, even in the relatively well-honed
case of FDA adverse event reports, many assumptions must be made to
identify drugs whose NDA number has not been entered into the
system, leaving millions of AERs unutilized. The same problems would
presumably affect any epidemiological database premised upon a health
plan, where physicians filing reports on adverse consequences of
pharmaceutical utilization may be subject to the same error.
The possibility that a set of consumers (or consumer
experiences) is lumped into the wrong bin is a special case of
classification error. But it can also constitute partition error. In partition
error, analysts attribute product risks from one class of products to a
subclass that is appreciably different (inclusion error), and/or fail to
include a subclass into a larger class in which the subclass properly
belongs (exclusion error).
Imagine a set of mortgages or credit cards that differ in their
mortgage terms (fixed-rate versus adjustable-rate), their pre-payment
penalties, the declension of their rates (whether they have up-front
"bonus" rates, "teaser interest rates," or conditional prizes attached),
their amortization schedules, and the terms and transparency of their
disclosure. A set of credit cards sold by the same bank would qualify as
separable products once these characteristics are taken into account and
so would mortgages, consumer loans, and other debt and credit
instruments.
At present there is no universal system assigning a unique
product identifier that can be used to distinguish retail financial
products from one another. This is so even when one focuses upon a
market for particular kinds of consumer financial products, say
excluding the mortgage market from analysis and focusing purely on
the market for credit cards. Analysts such as consumer financial
regulators, university scholars, and consumer advocates may observe a
sample of loan defaults, personal bankruptcies, or other risk-associated
events. Yet these databases do not generally contain data that allow
analysts to differentiate among products. Even in cases where
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proprietary datasets are used, or where analysts have regional databases
of consumer loans, the data often exclude important product
characteristics differentiating one contract from another, and almost
always exclude data on the other kinds of loans and credit/debt
instruments held by consumers.
This opens the possibility that in trying to make even
observational inferences about the interaction of products with certain
consumers, analysts are committing implicit or explicit partition error.
Analysts might make inferences about the properties of a class of
subprime mortgages, for instance, when in fact the risk is heterogeneous
depending on whether the subprime mortgage comes with a teaser
interest rate or not. In order to properly classify consumer financial
products, and in order to properly reclassify them to reflect new
information and new analysis, analysts must have a product identifier
that permits a clear assignment of the product into a category. A product
identifier can reduce partition error by enhancing the process of
classifying products according to certain critical characteristics,
characteristics that may be associated with (and even cause) consumer
risk. Without a unique product identifier, the costs of this classification
(and the costs and even possibility of reclassification) can become
prohibitive, as an exhaustive search through text, or perhaps a blind
reliance upon the text, would be required. Hence partition error will
lead to classification error, which will generate attributional error
(invalid or inefficient inferences).
The lack of a product identifier can make this problem worse in
ways that again quickly rise in proportion to the complexity of the
problem being addressed.64 This will happen if misclassification
increases more quickly than successful classification. If we assume that
the risk of misclassification weakly increases along with the possible
number of product characteristics available, then this suggests genuine
trouble for a system without a reliable product identifier. 65 When the
64. This follows Marina Meili, Comparing Clusterings-An Information-Based
Distance, 98 J. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIs 873, 875 (2007), originally, and Justin Grimmer &
Gary King, Quantitative Discovery from Qualitative Information: A General-Purpose
Document Clustering Methodology (July 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Dept. of Gov't and Inst. for Quantitative Soc. Sci., Harvard Univ.).
65. By "weakly increasing" we mean that the risk never decreases, and increases
strictly at least once, while the number of product characteristics rises. For a full exposition
of the underlying mathematical model, see Carpenter, supra note 63.
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number of product characteristics that should be taken into account
grows, and when the analyst is limited to crude categorizations among
these products, then the number of possible errors grows even further,
and does so exponentially. A carefully designed product identifier
reduces this chance of error.
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR CONSUMER FINANCE: UNIQUE PRODUCT
IDENTIFIERS FOR RETAIL FINANCIAL PRODUCTS
Product identifiers might be applied to a newly regulated world
that has never before seen them: consumer financial products, especially
mortgages, credit cards, consumer loans such as auto loans, and other
retail financial products. Since 2011, these products have come under
the jurisdiction of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB). While the CFPB is still assembling its data sources, what is
quite clear is that for the time being, there is no product identifier either
across types of financial products or within markets (e.g., within credit
cards) to assist the agency.
Yet the prospect of a unique product identifier for consumer
financial products (which are essentially variable forms of contract)
should not be dismissed. While the Bureau does not have pre-market
approval power over new financial products, a financial product
identifier can still be synthesized using existing statutory authorities by
analyzing consumer credit contracts. Based on that analysis, the Bureau
could perform the following tasks:
* identify each product and assign it a unique
alphanumeric identifier;
* compile and analyze previous consumer
experience and safety data relevant to the safety
and use of the loan product, including (a) past
experience with similar products or the proposed
product; and (b) reference to relevant studies on
how average consumers as well as
subpopulations may be predicted to use the
product;
* link the identifier to post-origination data on
loan performance, workouts, and termination,
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and analyze the performance of all products,
including new products, going forward. (The
Bureau should collect these data if it does not
have them already); and
* for a subset of new products that are not
generally recognized as low risk to consumers
and/or the financial system, conduct "roll-out"
experiments in the laboratory or field to assess
the safety of the product.
A. Creation of a System to Generate Product Identifiers
To create product identifiers, a minimally invasive system,
based on the Bureau's existing statutory authority, to collect form
contracts for consumer financial products under the CFPB's jurisdiction
would be required institutionally. These contracts would be uploaded
into a database to allow the Bureau to construct product identifiers
based on the contract terms.
This system would involve four different processes. First, the
Bureau would require all consumer financial product providers under its
jurisdiction to submit the underlying form contracts for each of the
providers' different products within a prescribed timeframe. As new
products are developed, providers would submit the form contracts for
those products to the Bureau on a quarterly basis. Providers would also
submit amendments to existing consumer finance contracts (e.g., in the
context of credit cards) quarterly.
Each of these submissions would contain a proposed label, the
product contract, 66 and a full description of the product. The product
description should include a schedule of the full range of parameters for
numeric terms such as principal, interest rates and fees, the product term
and amortization schedule, interest rate indices, margins and caps,
prepayment penalties, any equity-sharing arrangement, and other terms
that the Bureau deemed relevant. The Bureau could mandate this
reporting under its statutory monitoring powers, which give the CFPB
66. The contractual terms for some consumer financial products involve two or more
contractual documents. Residential mortgage loans, for instance, always involve both a note
and a mortgage (or deed of trust). The submission would encompass all of the documents
comprising the contract between the provider and the customer.
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"authority to gather information from time to time regarding the
organization, business conduct, markets, and activities of covered
persons and service providers." 67 Alternatively, FSOC and the Office
of Financial Research could require such reporting using their statutory
power to mandate financial companies to submit other reports so FSOC
can evaluate threats that financial activities pose to the financial
stability of the United States. 68
Second, for the various consumer financial products embodied
by the contracts, a team of analysts would render a categorization
consistent with finding the most refined mesh available for a set of
products that would leave sufficient sample sizes for statistical cross-
product comparisons.
Third, the Bureau would report each product identifier back to
the provider. 69 Each provider would be required to assign the correct
identifier prospectively to all of its individual loan files and report that
identifier in all loan-level data reported to the Bureau. In addition, the
Bureau would work with developers of data standards and with the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the government-sponsored entities
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), and proprietary data providers to adopt a product identifier field
for both static and dynamic consumer financial product datasets.
Finally, the Bureau would provide on its website a publicly
available and searchable database with the form contracts, the
associated product identifiers, the providers' names, and the
components of each product identifier for the purpose of public
research. This database would build on the Bureau's existing credit
card agreement database, except that submissions would be mandatory
and the database would feature the addition of unique product
identifiers.
67. 12 U.S.C § 2807 (2012). The Bureau also has power to mandate reporting of
information and data under its supervisory powers, under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act, and under a mortgage default and foreclosure database (to be created jointly with the
Department of Housing and Urban Development). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq. (2012).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(d)(3)(A) (2012).
69. This function could be automated, for example, with email notifications directing
providers to a Bureau website containing each submission and the associated product
identifier.
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B. Construction of the Identifier
Given a contract collection system like the one described, a
unique identifier could be established using the following procedure.
First, have a group of experts (perhaps in consultation with the CFPB's
Consumer Advisory Board 70 and Academic Research Council,7n joined
by consumers themselves) create a set of product bins that establish
significant differences across product types (APR and simple interest
paid, payment and amortization schedules, closing costs and other fees
where applicable, and penalties and triggers) while permitting sufficient
aggregation of products within each bin to permit statistical analysis. 72
Next, for a given product field (credit cards and mortgages), the
agency would represent each consumer financial product by two data
sets: (1) the text of the contract and (2) symbolic data representing
individual contract terms. Call this dual data set the document-symbol
pair (DSP). Following this, the agency would classify individual
document-symbol pairs into the bins established by experts, 73 thus
establishing an alphanumeric product type identifier. Each contract,
along with all summary data provided with the contract, would be made
publicly available in searchable format on the Bureau's website. Once a
product identifier was established with different databases, the Bureau
would be in a position to perform several analyses that, in our
estimation, no financial regulator can now perform: (1) whether a
particular financial product carries greater observed risk to consumers
than other, similar products in the same market, and (2) whether a
particular combination of financial products places consumers in greater
(possibly superadditive) risk than do others.
C. Linkage ofIdentifier to Post-Loan Performance Data
Once each loan has an identifier, then the identifier can be used
in post-loan performance and risk data sets collected by public agencies
70. 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (2012).
71. See Advisory Groups, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/advisory-groups/
(last visited May 29, 2013).
72. This would probably be time-consuming, but could be performed through
"mechanical Turking" so as to exploit the wisdom and labor of many decentralized agents.
73. This could be accomplished using a Sammon multidimensional scaling algorithm,
following Justin Grimmer & Gary King, General Purpose Computer-Assisted Clustering
and Conceptualization, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIENCES 2643 (2011).
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(such as Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data) and private firms (such
as DataQuick and CoreLogic data). Indeed, once an identifier is
created, private firms will have strong incentives to better organize their
internal data and their risk analytics by using the identifier. This raises,
of course, the question of why such an identifier does not already exist.
The answer lies in well-known problems of collective action and
coordination. If an identifier were created, all firms would benefit but
they would benefit whether or not they paid the up-front costs of
cooperating with others to create a common standard for the identifier.
Hence each firm has an incentive to free-ride off of the efforts of others.
The coordination problem arises because unique identifiers usually need
a centralized infrastructure-a central repository where the identifiers
can be kept and where duplicates are avoided-and while this central
agent need not be a government agency, it should be a government
agency if the creation and enforcement of the identifier requires legal
authority and the ability to monitor whether loan originators are
complying with the standards of the identifier.
D. Roll-Out Experiments with New Financial Products
While the architecture for experiments with new products is not
yet constructed, one could imagine a process whereby certain firms are
incented to randomly assign an inducement or advertisement to one
kind of loan versus another. The "treatment" for such an experiment
would be the differential inducement provided to consumers to take one
kind of loan form (a new financial product) versus another similar loan,
and then the performance of these loans along with various risk
indicators (financial stress, delinquency, underwater status, foreclosure,
bankruptcy) could be tracked. Various studies have occurred in the
retail financial field, and various ideas about so-called field experiments
with new financial products have been proposed, yet data monitoring
for such studies would probably be greatly facilitated by the creation of
an identifier which would permit comparison of the products used by
research subjects.74
74. See, e.g., Philornena M. Bacon & Peter G. Moffatt, Mortgage Choice as a Natural
Field Experiment on Choice Under Risk, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1401 (2012);
Stephanie Moulton, et al., Field Experiments on the Impact of Financial Planning
Interventions for Recent Homebuyers (Ctr. for Fin. Sec., Univ. of Wis.-Madison, Working
Paper 2011-CFS.5, 2011).
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V. CONCLUSION
The benefits of a unique product identifier for consumer
financial products would, we believe, far outweigh the costs, which
would largely be experienced upfront and would wane over time as
adaptation to the identifier would be experienced across numerous
markets. The time is ripe for action by the federal government,
including by the CFPB, that will create such an identifier and erect an
infrastructure in which it is used and maintained.

